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Abstract: We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully
appreciate what prices convey about others’ private information. Markets comprising solely such
“cursed” traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals
arbitrage distortions caused by cursed traders, mixed markets can generate even more trade.
Per-trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear
when traders infer others’ information from prices, even when they dismiss it as noisier than
their own. Making private information public raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but lowers
cursed volume given moderate non-informational trading motives.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982), researchers have understood that common
knowledge of rationality combined with a common prior precludes purely speculative trade. Of
course, people might rationally trade financial assets for a variety of non-speculative motives, such
as portfolio rebalancing and liquidity. Yet even in settings where the presence of non-speculative
motives allows for speculative trade, a rational understanding of the adverse-selection problem
causes the overall volume of trade to be constrained by non-speculative motives. In many people’s
estimation, trading volume in financial markets greatly exceeds what can be plausibly explained
by models applying rational-expectations equilibrium (REE).1
Researchers have sought to explain excessive trading volume by relaxing the common-prior
assumption. Harrison and Kreps (1978) show how non-common priors about an asset’s payoff gen-
erate volume in a dynamic model where risk-neutral traders cannot sell the asset short. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) use Harrison and Kreps’ framework to explore traders who are “overconfident”:
all traders observe all signals about the payoff, yet certain traders overestimate the information
content of certain signals.2 In these models without private information, trade derives from traders
agreeing to disagree about the relationship between payoff and public information; the lack of pri-
vate information disencumbers traders from the need to invert market prices.3 A second approach
incorporates non-common priors into incomplete-information models by assuming that privately
informed traders agree to disagree about the precision of traders’ private information. Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Odean (1998), for example, show how traders’ over-
1For example, in his presidential address to the American Finance Association, French (2008) notes that the
capitalized cost of trading exceeds 10% of market capitalization, and turnover in 2007 was 215%, creating a puzzle
that “from the perspective of the negative-sum game, it is hard to understand why equity investors pay to turn their
aggregate portfolio over more than two times in 2007” (page 1552).
2Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) model overconfidence similarly, allowing also for heterogenous priors, in a
model where the number of shares of a risky asset increases over time.
3Other models of trade deriving from differences in beliefs include Lintner (1969) and Varian (1985), where traders
have different subjective priors, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), where symmetrically informed
traders disagree because some of them (“noise traders”) misperceive next-period prices for exogenous reasons, Harris
and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995), where traders disagree about the informativeness of public signals,
and Biais and Bossaerts (1998), where traders are uncertain about others’ belief hierarchy. Hong and Stein (2007)
summarize this literature. Eyster and Piccione (2013) model traders with incomplete theories of price formation, also
in a complete-information setting.
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confidence about the precision of their private information can increase trading volume. Similarly,
Odean (1998), Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009), Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2010), and
Banerjee (2011) show that when traders downplay the precision of one another’s private signals—
which we call dismissiveness—volume also increases.4 In this second class of agreeing-to-disagree
models, the presence of private information infuses market prices with information content, and
traders are assumed to fully invert market prices to uncover others’ information. Both types of
agreeing-to-disagree models depict traders who recognize their disagreements in beliefs—and trade
because of these recognized disagreements.
This paper proposes a different conceptual approach to explaining speculative trade: people
trade because they neglect disagreements in beliefs. We capture this idea in a simple and tractable
model where some or all traders, when choosing their demands, do not fully invert prices to uncover
others’ information. This approach builds on extensive evidence, reviewed in Section 5, that people
do not sufficiently heed the information content of others’ behavior, even in the absence of intrinsic
disagreements.
Not inferring information from prices may appear observationally similar to inferring and then
dismissing that information. We show that the implications for prices are indeed similar, but the
implications for trading volume can differ sharply. In particular, disagreement neglect generates
large volume in settings where overconfidence and some natural forms of dismissiveness do not.
Disagreement neglect also “enables” overconfidence and other biases to have large effects on volume,
while the effects would be small in its absence.
Section 2 introduces our formal set-up, based on Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980), and Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981). We consider a market in which traders can exchange a risky asset for a
riskless asset over one period. Each trader observes a public and a private signal about the risky
asset’s payoff, with all signals being independent conditional on that payoff. Each trader also
receives a random endowment, whose covariance with the asset payoff he is the only one to observe.
Random endowments furnish traders with a non-speculative (hedging) motive to trade. We define
4Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009), Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2010), and Banerjee (2011) use the term
“differences of opinion” to describe the heterogeneity in beliefs that drives their models. We use the term dismissive-
ness instead, to distinguish it from overconfidence and other disagreements about signal structures that also create
differences of opinion.
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cursed-expectations equilibrium (CEE) by the assumption that some traders do not infer information
from the asset price. We call traders who do not extract any information fully cursed and traders
who extract some information partially cursed. CEE is the competitive-markets analogue of the
game-theoretic concept of cursed equilibrium, defined by Eyster and Rabin (2005) and reviewed
in Appendix A.5 For tractability, we assume that traders have constant-absolute-risk-aversion
(CARA) preferences and that all relevant probability distributions are normal.
Section 3 derives the main predictions of CEE in a simple version of our model, where traders
are symmetric in private-signal precision, risk aversion, and cursedness, and there are no random
endowments or public signals. The most important implication of CEE is also the most basic:
cursedness produces substantial trade, with aggregate volume approaching infinity as the number
of traders grows large. We show additionally that per-trader volume increases with the number of
traders. This is because the discrepancy between each private signal and the average of all signals
increases with the number of traders, and volume is proportional to this discrepancy since each
cursed trader gives a constant positive weight to his own signal, failing to realize that the price
reveals the average signal. Cursedness distorts not only volume, but also prices: because traders
do not fully infer others’ information from the price, the price under-reacts to private signals, and
hence price changes are positively autocorrelated.
Section 3 next contrasts the implications of cursedness to those of overconfidence and dismis-
siveness. Following Odean (1998), we model overconfident traders as exaggerating the precision of
their own private signal, and dismissive traders as under-estimating the precision of other traders’
private signals. We allow for an additional form of dismissiveness, introduced by Banerjee (2011):
traders treat the noise in others’ signals as correlated (while in fact it is independent), hence
under-estimating the collective precision of others’ signals. As in previous literature, we assume
that overconfident or dismissive traders fully understand the mapping between the price and other
traders’ private information.
Because overconfident traders overweight their own signals and estimate correctly the preci-
5In the special case where all agents are fully cursed, cursed equilibrium coincides with a version of the analogy-
based-expectations equilibrium (ABEE) defined by Jehiel (2005) and extended to incomplete-information games by
Jehiel and Frederic (2008). In this sense, CEE with fully cursed agents can be regarded as a competitive-market
analog of ABEE.
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sion of others’ signals, the price over-reacts to private signals. When traders are dismissive, the
price instead under-reacts to private signals. Hence, dismissiveness has similar implications to
cursedness for prices, while overconfidence has opposite implications. Our over- and under-reaction
results for overconfidence and dismissiveness are similar to those in, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1998), and Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009).
The implications of cursedness differ sharply from those of dismissiveness and overconfidence for
the question of trading volume. While per-trader volume increases with the number of traders under
cursedness, it converges to zero under overconfidence. Intuitively, even though each overconfident
trader thinks that he knows more than he does, he understands that the total amount of “valid”
information revealed by the price in a large market swamps his own information. Hence, the same
no-trade logic that prevails in REE also prevails in large markets of overconfident traders. The
same is true for dismissive traders when they understand correctly that others’ private signals
are conditionally independent. When dismissive traders mistakenly assume some correlation, per-
trader volume converges to a positive limit, and hence aggregate volume converges to infinity. Yet,
per-trader volume can be decreasing, hump-shaped or increasing in the number of traders, while it
is always increasing under cursedness.
Additional differences concern the behavior of volume when private information is revealed
publicly. Public revelation of traders’ private signals does not change overconfident or dismissive
volume because such volume is generated by disagreements about signal precisions, which persist
even when signals are made public. By contrast, cursed volume shrinks to zero because it stems
from traders’ failure to infer the signals from the price, and this failure becomes irrelevant when
signals are public.
In addition to generating large trading volume in the absence of other errors, cursedness enables
overconfidence to have large effects on volume. Indeed, cursed overconfident traders fail to infer
the average signal from the price, so they trade even in a large market—and more so the more
overconfident they are. In this sense, cursedness and overconfidence work as complements, and
cursedness helps vindicate the basic intuition from the literature that overconfidence can be a
significant source of trading volume. Cursedness may similarly exacerbate other biases as well, as
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we argue in Section 6, where we conclude the paper.
In Section 4, we extend the model in three different directions. First, we allow traders to observe
a public signal. Whereas private signals continue to affect price less than in REE, the public signal
influences price more than it does in REE. This is because cursed traders use fewer signals than
rational traders, so they attach larger weight to each signal that they do use. Because observing the
public signal induces traders to attach less weight to their private signals, cursed volume decreases.
The latter result is in the spirit of public revelation of private signals reducing cursed trade.
Our second extension is to allow for random endowments. As in, e.g., Akerlof (1970) and Hir-
shleifer (1971), asymmetric information about asset values impedes non-speculative trade because
traders worry that others’ trades reflect such information rather than hedging needs. Conversely,
public revelation of traders’ private signals causes volume to increase. Asymmetric information also
impedes dismissive trade, but stimulates cursed trade when the variance of hedging needs is small.
Our final extension is to allow traders to differ in signal precision, risk aversion, and cursedness.
When some traders are cursed and some are rational, the latter exploit the positive autocorrelation
of price changes induced by the former. Because of the predictability-induced trading by rationals,
volume is larger in markets that include both rational and cursed traders than in those comprising
solely cursed traders.
The link between non-inference from price and positively autocorrelated price changes was first
shown in Hong and Stein (1999). Some or all of their traders are “newswatchers,” assumed to
trade based on signals or news they watch without inverting price to infer unwatched news. Hong
and Stein show that prices move predictably when information diffuses gradually, yielding positive
autocorrelation. A key difference between our work and theirs is that we analyze trading volume and
compare its level to that predicted by alternative models such as overconfidence and dismissiveness.
Vives and Yang (2017) propose an optimal-inattention-style variant of partial cursedness in which
each trader observes the price but employs a noisy signal of it to infer the information that it
contains and can pay a cost to reduce the noise. They endogenize traders’ sophistication levels and
show that sophistication acquisition can exhibit complementarities.6
6Kondor and Köszegi (2017) apply cursedness to financial innovation. Issuers in their model design securities
using their payoff-relevant private information, which investors fail to infer. Investors are worse off when issuers
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2 Model and Equilibrium Concept
We begin this section by defining cursed-expectations equilibrium in a general version of our model.
We then make more specific assumptions on traders’ utility functions and the distribution of their
information that allow us to derive analytically tractable, linear equilibria.
There are two periods, 1 and 2, and two assets that pay off in terms of a consumption good
in Period 2. One asset is riskless and pays off one unit of the consumption good with certainty.
The other asset is risky and pays d = d+ ǫ+ ζ units, where d is a constant and (ǫ, ζ) are random
variables with mean zero. We use the riskless asset as the numeraire, and denote by p the price
of the risky asset in Period 1. Our choice of numeraire implies that the price of the risky asset in
Period 2 is d and the riskless rate is zero. We assume that the risky asset is in zero supply.
There are N traders who can exchange the two assets in Period 1. Trader i = 1, .., N observes
the private signal
si = ǫ+ ηi, (1)
as well as the public signal
s = ǫ+ θ, (2)
which is also observed by all other traders. The random variables ({ηi}i=1,..,N , θ) have mean zero.
The signals are observed in Period 1. They provide information about the component ǫ of the risky
asset’s payoff but not about ζ.
Trader i starts with a zero endowment of the riskless and the risky assets, and receives an
endowment zid of the consumption good in Period 2. We refer to zi as the endowment shock,
and assume that it is observed privately by trader i in Period 1 and has mean zero. Through its
correlation with d, the endowment generates a hedging motive to trade. When zi > 0, for example,
trader i is exposed to the risk that d will be low and wishes to hedge by selling the risky asset. We
can securitize a larger pool of underlying assets or can create more securities out of the pool—a result reversing the
traditional logic that diversification benefits investors.
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assume that the variables (ǫ, ζ, {ηi}i=1,..,N , θ, {zi}i=1,..,N ) are mutually independent.
The budget constraint of trader i is
ci = xi(d− p) + zid, (3)
where xi denotes the number of shares of the risky asset that the trader buys in Period 1 and ci
denotes the trader’s consumption in Period 2. Negative values of xi correspond to shares sold. We
impose no portfolio constraints, allowing xi to take any value in R.
Traders maximize expected utility of consumption. We denote by ui(ci) the utility that trader
i derives from consumption in Period 2. If the trader is rational, then he maximizes the expected
utility
E[ui(xi(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi, p}]
in Period 1, where we use (3) to substitute for ci. A rational trader conditions his estimate of
the asset payoff d on his private signal, the public signal, the endowment shock, and the price. If
instead the trader is fully cursed, then he completely neglects the relationship between the price
and other traders’ information, and maximizes the expected utility
E[ui(xi(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi}],
which differs from the rational utility because there is no conditioning on the price. Full cursed-
ness can be viewed as a form of inattention: a fully cursed trader neglects to think through the
information that the market price conveys. We also allow for behavior that lies between rationality
and full cursedness. If a trader is partially cursed, then he infers the information conveyed by price
partially but not fully, and maximizes the utility
E[ui(xi(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi, p}]1−χiE[ui(xi(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi}]χi ,
which is a geometric average of the rational expected utility with weight 1−χi and the fully cursed
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expected utility with weight χi. The parameter χi ∈ [0, 1] measures the extent of cursedness:
χi = 0 corresponds to rationality, χi = 1 to full cursedness, and χi ∈ (0, 1) to partial cursedness.
We employ the geometric average of utilities rather than the arithmetic average as in Eyster and
Rabin (2005) for tractability.
The objective function of partially cursed traders involves two information sets, the one un-
der rationality and the one under full cursedness. Hence, these traders may appear to have two
conflicted selves, a rational and a fully cursed one. Indeed, to the extent that they actively in-
terrogate others’ trading motivations, traders may discern the information content in prices; but
to the extent that they dwell upon their own private information, traders may overlook that con-
nection. Consequently, a trader’s demand may vary with his focus. Under that interpretation, a
partially cursed trader who reaches two different conclusions about demand when thinking about
the problem in two different ways simply averages the two demand functions. Alternatively (and
in a somewhat similar spirit) we can interpret the partially cursed traders’ objective function as
an “as if” one: this objective function captures in a compact way the idea that traders partially
neglect the information conveyed by price. Consistent with this interpretation, the maximization
of the partially cursed traders’ objective yields a demand function that always lies between the
rational and the fully cursed one.
One could alternatively conceptualize partially cursed traders as perceiving the price correctly
for budgeting while simultaneously overestimating its noisiness for the purpose of inference. That is,
partially cursed traders observe p—and understand that the risky asset costs p—but for inference
believe that they instead observe p + φ, where φ is noise. This alternative model maps closely
to ours. In particular, rational behavior corresponds to zero variance of φ, fully cursed behavior
to infinite variance, and partially cursed behavior to intermediate values. Vives and Yang (2017)
analyze a model in a similar spirit. They assume that when traders infer from the price, they
evaluate a noisy signal of price, p + φ, rather than price p. (In the interpretation sketched above,
by contrast, traders treat the market price p as if it were p+ φ.)
Our definition of cursed-expectations equilibrium (CEE) combines utility maximization under
cursed expectations with market clearing. As in the case of rational-expectations equilibrium
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(REE), the equilibrium involves a price function p that depends on all the random variables in the
model. These are the private signals {si}i=1,...,N , the public signal s, and the endowment shocks
{zi}i=1,...,N .
Definition 1 A price function p({si}i=1,...,N , s, {zi}i=1,...,N)) and demand functions
{xi(si, s, zi, p)}i=1,...,N are a cursed-expectations-equilibrium (CEE) if:




E[ui(x(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi, p}]1−χiE[ui(x(d− p) + zid)|{si, s, zi}]χi
}
, (4)




xi = 0. (5)
We next specialize our analysis by making two assumptions that allow us to derive tractable
linear equilibria. First, the variables (ǫ, ζ, {ηi}i=1,..,N , θ, {zi}i=1,..,N) follow normal distributions,
with variances denoted by (σ2ǫ , σ
2
ζ , {σ2ηi}i=1,..,N , σ2θ , {σ2zi}i=1,..,N) and precisions, i.e., the inverses
of the variances, denoted by (τǫ, τζ , {τηi}i=1,..,N , τθ, {τzi}i=1,..,N). Second, traders have negative
exponential, or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), utility functions: ui(ci) = − exp(−αici),
where αi is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.










for coefficients ({Ai}i=1,..N , B, {Ci}i=1,..N ). For CARA utility, we can write the expectations in (4)
as












where the information set Ii is equal to Iir ≡ {si, s, zi, p} for the rational expected utility and to
Iic ≡ {si, s, zi} for the fully cursed expected utility. The second step in (7) follows because all
variables are normally distributed. Substituting (7) into (4) and maximizing, we find the demand
function
xi =
(1− χi)E(d|Iir) + χiE(d|Iic)− p
αi [(1− χi)Var(d|Iir) + χiVar(d|Iic)]
− zi. (8)
The demand function is the solution to a mean-variance problem. The conditional expectation of
the asset payoff in that problem is the weighted average of the rational expectation with weight
1−χi and the fully cursed expectation with weight χi. The conditional variance of the asset payoff
is the same weighted average of the rational and fully cursed variances. The geometric average
formulation of utilities ensures that traders’ optimization problems retain a tractable mean-variance
structure even under partial cursedness. Combining (8) with the market-clearing condition (5), we
derive conditions in Proposition 1 so that (6) is an equilibrium price. Proposition 1 does not show
existence or uniqueness of ({Ai}i=1,..N , B, {Ci}i=1,..N) satisfying these conditions, both of which
are instead demonstrated in the special cases studied in subsequent sections.
To state Proposition 1, we introduce some notation. From the perspective of a rational trader
i, the price (6) includes information on (si, s, zi), which the trader knows, and on ({si}j 6=i, {zi}j 6=i),

















We denote the variance of ξi by σ
2
ξi
and its precision by τξi .
Proposition 1 The price (6) is an equilibrium price if and only if ({Ai}i=1,..N , B, {Ci}i=1,..N )
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satisfy the conditions
τηi(τǫ + τηi + τθ + χiτξi)− (1− χi)τξi Ai∑
k 6=i Ak
(τǫ + τηi + τθ)





(τǫ + τηj + τθ)(τǫ + τηj + τθ + τξj )− (1− χj)τξj 1∑
k 6=j Ak
(τǫ + τηj + τθ)
αj
[





τθ(τǫ + τηi + τθ + χiτξi)





(τǫ + τηj + τθ)(τǫ + τηj + τθ + τξj )
αj
[
(τǫ + τηj + τθ)(τǫ + τηj + τθ + τξj) + τζ(τǫ + τηj + τθ + χjτξj )
] , (12)
Ci = Aiαi
(τǫ + τηi + τθ)(τǫ + τηi + τθ + τξi) + τζ(τǫ + τηi + τθ + χiτξi)
τζτηi(τǫ + τηi + τθ + χiτξi)
. (13)
In addition to the price, we are interested in trading volume. We define the volume generated
by trader i as the absolute value of the number xi of shares of the risky asset that trader i buys
in equilibrium, or sells if xi is negative. The aggregate volume is the sum of the volume generated
by each trader. We compute expected volume, defined as the unconditional expectation of volume
over the realizations of all random variables in the model.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium in the baseline case where traders are symmetric, receive
no random endowments, and observe only their private signals and not the public one. We compute
the price and trading volume, and compare cursedness to overconfidence and dismissiveness.
To specialize the equilibrium conditions derived in Proposition 1 to symmetric traders, we set
private-signal precisions τηi , risk-aversion coefficients αi, and cursedness parameters χi to values
(τη, α, χ) common for all traders. To dispense with random endowments, we set the variances
{σ2zi}i=1,..,N to zero, so that the endowment shocks are equal to their mean which is zero. To
eliminate the public signal, we set its precision τθ to zero. We relax all these restrictions in Section
4.
11
3.1 Price and Trading Volume






Proposition 2 Suppose that traders are symmetric with cursedness parameter χ, receive no ran-
dom endowments, and observe only their private signals. The price (14) is an equilibrium price if
and only if
A =
τη ([N − χ(N − 1)] τǫ +Nτη)
N(τǫ + τη)(τǫ +Nτη)
. (15)
The coefficient A decreases in χ. For χ > 0, price changes exhibit positive autocorrelation: the
regression
d− p = β(p− d) + ν, (16)








Volume increases in χ and N .
When traders are rational (χ = 0), the price equals the expected value of the asset payoff
d conditional on all the private signals. The result that the price aggregates the private signals
efficiently is as in Grossman (1976). Moreover, trading volume is zero, consistent with the no-
trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982). The no-trade theorem applies
because traders start with zero endowments in the risky asset and receive no random endowments,
so no-trade is a Pareto-efficient allocation.
When traders are fully cursed (χ = 1), they do not condition on the price, and hence the
private signal si of a trader i receives no weight in other traders’ conditional expectations of the
12
asset payoff. As a consequence, the weight of si on the price, i.e., the coefficient A, is smaller in the
fully cursed case than in the rational case. The same logic carries through to partial cursedness: A
is smaller when traders are partially cursed than when they are rational, and decreases in χ, i.e.,
is smaller when traders are more cursed. Since A is smaller than in the rational case, the price
under-reacts to the private signals.
The price under-reaction implies positively autocorrelated price changes. The positive auto-
correlation is reflected in the regression (16). The dependent variable in (16) is the price change
between Period 1, in which the asset trades at p, and Period 2, in which the asset pays off d. The
independent variable is the price change between a Period 0, in which private signals have not yet
been revealed and the asset trades at the unconditional expectation d of its payoff, and Period 1.
The regression coefficient β is positive, meaning that a price rise in Period 1 predicts a further price
rise, and vice-versa for a price drop.
Since fully cursed traders do not learn others’ signals from the price, they trade with each other
even without random endowments. Moreover, the expected volume that each generates increases
in market size as measured by the number N of traders. To explain the intuition for the latter
result, we recall the demand function xi of a trader i, given by (8). With fully cursed traders and
no random endowments, (8) implies that the volume |xi| generated by trader i is proportional to
the discrepancy |E(d|Iic)− p| between the trader’s conditional expectation of the asset payoff and
the price. The conditional expectation is































Hence, the discrepancy |E(d|Iic)− p| increases, and so does the volume that trader i generates.7
Since per-trader volume increases in N , aggregate volume converges to infinity when N becomes
large. Hence, cursedness produces large volume in large markets with dispersed private information.
The result that per-trader volume increases with N extends to partially cursed traders. Indeed,
(8) implies that the volume |xi| that a partially cursed trader i generates is proportional to
|(1− χ)E(d|Iir) + χE(d|Iic)− p| = χ |E(d|Iic)− p| ,
where the equality follows from E(d|Iir) = p. The discrepancy between conditional expectation
and price is therefore proportional to that for a fully cursed trader, with proportionality coefficient
χ. As χ increases, so does volume.
Since there are no aggregate gains from trade and traders are symmetric, they are all made
worse off by trading. Traders take on excessive risk: they hold risky positions while in fact they
should be bearing no risk.
3.2 Comparison to Overconfidence and Dismissiveness
In this subsection, we examine the relationship between cursedness and other theories that have
been used in the literature to explain large trading volume. Under all the alternative theories
that we consider, traders exaggerate the precision of their own signals relative to the precision
of others’ signals. Such beliefs have often been described as overconfidence, but we distinguish
between different forms of overconfidence and use different terms to describe them.
We reserve the term overconfidence for its seemingly most direct form, whereby traders exag-
gerate the precision of their private signal. With symmetric traders, this means that each trader i
perceives the precision of his own signal si to be κτη for κ > 1. When trader i is merely overconfi-



























, as implied by (1), and because
the noise terms {ηj}j=1,..,N are independent.
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We use the term dismissiveness for beliefs under which traders underestimate the precision of
others’ signals. With symmetric traders, this means that each trader i incorrectly perceives the
precision of all other traders’ signals sj, j 6= i, to be γτη for γ ∈ [0, 1). When trader i is merely
dismissive, he correctly perceives the precision of his own private signal si to be τη.
We allow dismissive traders to not only underestimate the precision of others’ signals but to
also overestimate the correlation of the noise terms. That is, trader i can perceive incorrectly that
the noise terms ηj and ηj′ for j, j
′ 6= i are positively correlated with coefficient ρ > 0, while in fact
they are independent. That traders perceive some non-existent positive correlation is a form of
dismissiveness because it causes them to underestimate the information content of the collection of
others’ signals (rather than of each signal separately).
We distinguish between overconfidence and dismissiveness because they are conceptually differ-
ent and yield different equilibrium properties. We consider dismissive beliefs over both precision
and correlation because equilibrium properties also can differ. We assume that the beliefs of over-
confident or dismissive traders about the probability distribution of signals are common knowledge,
and hence traders agree to disagree. For example, it is common knowledge that each overconfident
trader thinks that he is better informed than all other traders think he is.
We nest overconfidence and dismissiveness in a single model, i.e., each trader can be both
overconfident and dismissive, and his dismissive beliefs can concern both precision and correlation.







for j 6= i, Cov(ηi, ηj) = 0 for j 6= i, and Cov(ηj , ηj′) = ργτη for j 6= j
′ and j, j′ 6= i.
Our nested model allows us to isolate the effects of each bias by setting the parameters corresponding
to the other biases to their values under rational expectations: κ and γ to one, and ρ to zero.
Our modelling of overconfidence follows Odean (1998), whom we also follow in modelling dis-
missiveness as underestimation of the precision of others’ signals. Modelling dismissiveness as
overestimation of correlations is in the spirit of Banerjee (2011), who also allows for underestima-
tion of precisions. In Banerjee, each trader i observes a private signal si = ǫ+ ηi and assumes that
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the signal of each other trader j 6= i is
sj = ρ̂ǫ+
√
(1− ρ̂2)φi + ηj,
where ρ̂ ∈ [0, 1] and φi is a random variable that is independent of ǫ. Trader i further assumes
that φi has the same distribution as ǫ, and perceives correctly the precisions of ǫ and ηj (within
his mispecified model for sj). If ρ̂ < 1, then trader i underestimates the precision of trader j’s
signal because he assumes that it includes the additional noise term
√
(1− ρ̂2)φi. Because that
term is independent of j, trader i also overestimates the correlation of the noise in others’ signals.
Note that the parameter ρ̂ in Banerjee plays an inverse role to ρ in our model: trader i’s estimated
correlation of the noise in others’ signals is decreasing in ρ̂ in Banerjee but is equal to (and hence
increasing in) ρ in our model.8
Proposition 3 Suppose that traders are symmetric and not cursed, receive no random endow-
ments, and observe only their private signals. Suppose also that each trader perceives the precision
of his private signal to be κτη for κ ≥ 1, the precision of every other trader’s signal to be γτη for
γ ∈ [0, 1], and the correlation between the noise terms in others’ signals to be ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The price
































8Banerjee does not require the noise terms ηi for i = 1, .., N to be independent, as we do in our model. An
additional difference between our specification and his is that we assume that ǫ enters with a unit coefficient in sj as
perceived by trader i, while the coefficient is ρ̂ in his model.
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Volume increases in κ and ρ, and decreases in γ. Volume decreases in N if
γ(κ− γ)τη
τǫ + τη + 2κτη
− γρ > (κ− γ) [τǫ + τζ + (κ+ γ)τη]
4(τǫ + τη + 2κτη)
, (20)
increases in N if
κρ [ρ(τǫ + τζ) + (κρ+ γ) τη]
2(τǫ + τη + 2κτη)
>
γ(κ− γ)τη
τǫ + τη + 2κτη
− γρ, (21)
and is hump-shaped in N for values of
γ(κ−γ)τη
τǫ+τη+2κτη
− γρ in the intermediate region. If γ > 0 and
ρ = 0, then volume converges to zero as the number N of traders grows large, and aggregate volume,
summed across traders, converges to a positive limit. If γ = 0 or ρ > 0, then volume converges to
a positive limit as N grows large, and aggregate volume converges to infinity.
Overconfidence and dismissiveness have opposite effects on the price. Fixing the dismissiveness
parameters (γ, ρ), more overconfidence (larger κ) causes traders to attach larger weight to their
own private signals. As a consequence, the weight of the signals on the price, i.e., the coefficient A,
increases. Fixing instead the overconfidence parameter κ, more dismissiveness (smaller γ or larger
ρ) causes traders to attach smaller weight to other traders’ private signals, as revealed by the price.
This causes A to decrease.
The effect of dismissiveness on the price goes in the same direction as that of cursedness. Indeed,
in both cases the coefficient A decreases relative to the rational case, and this happens because
traders underweight others’ signals. Cursed traders underweight others’ signals because they fail
to infer them from the price. Dismissive traders infer those signals from the price, but view them
as less informative than they actually are. In both cases the price under-reacts to the signals, and
price changes are positively autocorrelated.
Cursedness and dismissiveness have different implications for trading volume. The differences
are sharpest when γ > 0 and ρ = 0, i.e., dismissive traders do not treat others’ signals as pure noise
and perceive correctly that the noise terms in those signals are independent. Recall from Propo-
sition 2 that per-trader volume under cursedness increases as the number N of traders increases.
Hence, when N grows large, per-trader volume converges to a positive limit and aggregate volume
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converges to infinity. Proposition 3 shows instead that per-trader volume under overconfidence or
dismissiveness converges to zero, and aggregate volume converges to a finite limit. Thus, overcon-
fidence does not generate large aggregate volume in large markets with dispersed information, in
contrast to cursedness. Dismissivess does not generate large volume either, when γ > 0 and ρ = 0.
The ability of overconfident or dismissive traders to infer others’ signals from the price is key to
why they trade little in large markets. Indeed, such traders realize that the price fully reveals the
average signal of all other traders. And while they underestimate the precision of others’ signals
relative to their own signal, they understand that their own signal carries much less information
than the average of a large number of other, even less precise, signals. In large markets, therefore,
overconfident or dismissive traders base their expectations about the asset payoff almost exclusively
on the price. As a result, the difference between any two traders’ expectations converges to zero,
and so does per-trader volume. By contrast, cursed traders do not fully realize that the price reveals
the average signal of other traders. Hence, they give their signal non-negligible weight even in large
markets when forming their expectations about the asset payoff, and per-trader volume does not
converge to zero.
The different implications that cursedness and dismissiveness have for trading volume concern
not only the large N limit but also the comparative statics with respect to N . The differences
in comparative statics for large N follow directly from previous results. Since per-trader volume
under overconfidence and dismissiveness converges to zero when N grows large, it decreases with
N for large N . By contrast, per-trader volume under cursedness increases in N for all values of
N , so for large N changes in N have opposite effects on volume. These differences carry through
to all values of N if signals are precise enough (τη large) and overconfidence and dismissiveness are
not too extreme (γ is not close to zero and κ is not much larger than one). Indeed, Proposition 3
shows that overconfident and dismissive volume are decreasing in N if (3γ−κ)τη > τǫ+ τζ and are
hump-shaped in N otherwise.
Cursed and dismissive volume become more similar when γ = 0 or ρ > 0. When γ = 0,
dismissive traders perceive others’ signals as being pure noise, and hence ignore them completely
when forming their expectations of the asset payoff. This is observationally equivalent, in the
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context of our model, to fully cursed traders failing to infer the signals from price. (As we note below,
however, the observational equivalence breaks down when private signals are revealed publicly to
all traders.) In particular, price and trading volume are identical when χ = 1 (full cursedness) and
when κ = 1 and γ = 0 (no overconfidence and extreme dismissiveness). Hence, per-trader volume
increases in N , and aggregate volume converges to infinity when N grows large. The result that
per-trader volume under dismissiveness converges to zero, shown for γ > 0 and ρ = 0, breaks down
because traders view the average of pure-noise signals also as pure noise.
When ρ > 0, dismissive traders perceive incorrectly that the noise terms in others’ signals are
correlated, and hence do not view the average of a large number of such signals as much more
informative than their own signal. As a result, per-trader volume under dismissiveness does not
converge to zero when N grows large, but converges instead to a positive limit that is increasing in
ρ. Proposition 3 also implies that volume is decreasing or hump-shaped in N when ρ is small but
becomes increasing in N when ρ is close to one.
The assumptions γ = 0 and ρ > 0 are somewhat strong: under γ = 0 each trader treats informa-
tive signals as pure noise, and under ρ > 0 he treats independent errors by others as correlated and
assumes that he is the only one to avoid the common error. Since these assumptions are required
for dismissive volume to be large in large markets with dispersed information, cursedness may be
a more plausible explanation for large volume.9
Even when γ = 0 or ρ > 0, cursedness and dismissiveness can be distinguished in terms of
their implications for trading volume. Suppose that private signals are revealed publicly to all
traders. Cursed traders would then learn those signals, and their failure to infer from the price
would be inconsequential because the price would not contain any additional information. Hence,
cursed volume would decline to zero. By contrast, dismissive volume would remain the same.
Indeed, dismissive traders infer others’ signals from the price, and trade because they view them
as less informative than they actually are. Revealing the signals publicly would not change their
9Alternatively, overconfident or dismissive volume could be large in large markets if information dispersion is
limited and does not increase with market size. Suppose that there is a fixed number M of signals that does not
increase with the number N of traders, and that different groups of traders, of size N/M each, observe a different
signal. Increasing market size would not make the average of the signals more informative because the number of
distinct signals in the average would not change. Assumptions along these lines are made, for example, in Odean
(1998), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2010).
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information. Corollary 1 confirms these results.10 11
Corollary 1 Suppose that traders are symmetric, receive no random endowments, and observe
only their private signals. Public revelation of all private signals would impact volume as follows:
• If all traders are cursed, then volume would decline to zero.
• If all traders are overconfident or dismissive, then volume would not change.
3.3 Cursedness as an Enabling Bias
Cursedness not only generates large volume in large markets, but can also act as an “enabling
bias,” amplifying the effects that other biases may have on volume. Recall from Proposition 3 that
per-trader volume when overconfidence is the only bias (κ ≥ 1, χ = 0, γ = 1, ρ = 0) converges to
zero as market size N grows large. Key to this result is that while overconfident traders exaggerate
the information content of their signal, they realize that the average signal of all other traders, as
revealed by the price, conveys much more information. This effect is suppressed when overconfident
traders are also cursed, because there is no learning from the price. Hence, traders who are both
overconfident and cursed give their signal non-negligible weight even in large markets, and that
weight increases with the extent of overconfidence. Accordingly, per-trader volume in markets with
such traders converges to a positive limit as N grows large, and that limit is larger when traders
are more overconfident. Cursedness and overconfidence work as complements in generating trade:
overconfidence on its own does not generate large volume in large markets but does so in the
presence of cursedness.
Proposition 4 Suppose that traders are symmetric with cursedness parameter χ, receive no ran-
dom endowments, and observe only their private signals. Suppose also that each trader perceives
10Corollary 1 would hold even if the revealed information were the average of traders’ signals rather than each and
every signal. This is because with symmetry and normality, the average is a sufficient statistic for all the signals.
11An important difference between cursedness on the one hand, and overconfidence and dismissiveness on the other,
concerns the type of statistical relationships that people misperceive. Overconfident or dismissive people disagree
about the correlations between exogenous variables (private signals and asset payoff), and this creates disagreement
about the relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables (price and asset payoff). Cursed people, by
contrast, share common beliefs about correlations between exogenous variables and hold opposing beliefs only about
the relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables (price and asset payoff). This difference drives Corollary
1. It is important, in particular, that cursed traders can interpret others’ signals correctly when revealed.
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the precision of his private signal to be κτη for κ ≥ 1, the precision of every other trader’s signal to
be γτη for γ ∈ [0, 1], and the correlation between the noise terms in others’ signals to be ρ ∈ [0, 1].





















If χ > 0, then volume converges to a positive limit as the number N of traders grows large, and
that limit increases in the overconfidence parameter κ.
4 Extensions
4.1 Public Signal
In this section we re-introduce the public signal s = ǫ+ θ that was allowed for in our general model
but excluded from Section 3. We maintain the other assumptions of Section 3 that traders receive






Proposition 5 Suppose that traders are symmetric with cursedness parameter χ, receive no ran-
dom endowments, and observe their private signals and the public signal. The price (23) is an
equilibrium price if and only if
A =
τη ([N − (N − 1)χ] (τǫ + τθ) +Nτη)
N(τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
, (24)
B =
τθ (τǫ + [1 + (N − 1)χ] τη + τθ)
(τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
. (25)
The coefficient A decreases in χ and the coefficient B increases in χ. For χ > 0, the regression
d− p = β1(p− d) + β2s+ ν, (26)
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yields coefficients β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. The expected volume that each trader generates is
χτζ(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
√
2(N − 1)τη




and is lower than when traders do not observe the public signal.
As in Section 3, traders’ private signals enter the price with a smaller weight than in the rational
case. The public signal, however, enters the price with a larger weight. The intuition is easier to
understand in the case where traders are fully cursed. Since they form their conditional expectations
of the asset payoff using fewer signals than rational traders, they attach larger weight to each signal
they use. The public signal thus receives larger weight in each trader’s conditional expectation,
and enters the price with a larger weight. The same logic carries through to partial cursedness: B
is larger when traders are partially cursed than when they are rational, and increases in χ, i.e., is
larger when traders are more cursed.
Because the public signal enters the price with a larger weight than in the rational case, it
predicts future price changes negatively. This predictability is revealed from a bivariate regression
of the price change between Periods 1 and 2 on the public signal and on the price change between
Periods 0 and 1. The regression coefficient β2 on the public signal is negative. The coefficient
becomes zero, however, if the price change between Periods 0 and 1 is not controlled for. This is
because cursed traders understand the relationship between the public signal and the asset payoff,
so if they were to condition their expectation of the payoff on the public signal alone, they would
do so correctly.
The last result of Proposition 5 is that observing the public signal lowers volume. The intuition
is that cursed traders trade with each other because they observe different private signals and do
not learn others’ signals from the price. When they also observe the public signal, they give their
private signals less weight and hence trade less. This result is in the spirit of Corollary 1 that public
revelation of private signals reduces cursed trade.
Observing the public signal lowers volume not only under cursedness but also under overconfi-
dence and dismissiveness, and the intuition is the same. We show this result in the appendix, where
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we compute the equilibrium with overconfident and dismissive traders who observe a public signal
(Proposition B.1). We assume that overconfident and dismissive traders agree on the precision of
the public signal (as do cursed traders in this section). If instead, they disagree, volume could
remain the same, as shown in Corollary 1 for the case where private signals are publicly revealed,
or perhaps increase.
4.2 Random Endowments
In this section we re-introduce the random endowments that were allowed for in our general model
but excluded from Section 3. We maintain the other assumptions of Section 3 that traders observe
no public signal and are symmetric. We assume that the symmetry extends to the precision of











Proposition 6 Suppose that traders are symmetric with cursedness parameter χ, receive random
endowments, and observe only their private signals and endowment shocks. The price (28) is an












































































Volume increases in N , for χ ∈ {0, 1}.
Random endowments generate trade even among rational traders. This can be confirmed by
setting χ = 0 in (31): when there are no random endowments (τz = ∞) rational volume is zero
consistent with Proposition 2, and when there are random endowments (τz finite) rational volume
is positive. Eq. (31) implies additionally that per-trader volume in the rational case increases in
the number N of traders. Hence aggregate volume goes to infinity when N grows large.
Since rational volume is generated by random endowments, Proposition 6 suggests that these
endowments should generate large aggregate volume in large markets in all the cases that we
consider: rationality, cursedness, overconfidence, and dismissiveness.12 Eq. (31) indeed implies that
per-trader volume converges to a positive limit for all χ ∈ [0, 1], and hence aggregate volume in the
rational and cursed cases is large in large markets. The same result holds for overconfidence and
dismissiveness, as we show in the appendix, where we compute the equilibrium with overconfident
and dismissive traders who receive random endowments (Proposition B.2).
While the limit behavior of volume when traders receive random endowments is the same under
cursedness and under dismissiveness, other properties of volume can differ. Section 3 emphasizes
two such properties in the absence of random endowments: the dependence of volume on N , and
the effect of revealing private signals publicly. The differences on how cursed and dismissive volume
depend on N , shown in Section 3, extend to small endowment shocks by continuity. Corollary 2
examines how cursed and dismissive volume change when private signals are revealed publicly.
Continuity does not pin down the effect on dismissive volume because there is no effect in the
absence of random endowments. Continuity also does not pin down the effect on rational volume
12Although rational traders trade both because of random endowments and private information, random endow-
ments generate rational volume in the sense that volume would be zero in their absence. The contribution of private
information to rational volume is, in fact, negative, as shown in Corollary 2: when private signals are revealed publicly,
traders trade only because of random endowments and volume goes up.
24
because that volume is zero in the endowments’ absence.
Corollary 2 Suppose that traders are symmetric, receive random endowments, and observe only
their private signals and endowment shocks. Public revelation of all private signals would impact
volume as follows:
• If all traders are rational, then volume would increase.
• If all traders are cursed, then volume would increase when χ is close to zero and decrease
when χ is close to one.
• If all traders are non-fully dismissive (κ = 1, γ ∈ (0, 1), and ρ ≥ 0), then volume would
increase. Volume could decrease, however, if in addition traders are overconfident (κ > 1).
• If all traders are fully dismissive (γ = 0) or fully overconfident (κ = ∞), volume would not
change.
Recall from Corollary 1 that in the absence of random endowments, cursed volume drops to zero
if signals are publicly revealed because traders learn the average signal and no longer trade on their
own signal. In the presence of random endowments, a similar effect appears for both rational and
cursed traders: public revelation of the signals induces traders to no longer trade on their own signal
because they learn the average signal, rather than a noisy version of it from the price. We term
this the information-trading effect. At the same time, a new effect appears: public revelation of the
signals induces traders to trade more aggressively when the price moves in response to endowment
shocks because they are not worried that these movements may instead be due to information. We
term this the risk-sharing effect.
When traders are rational, the risk-sharing effect dominates the information-trading effect, and
public revelation of the signals raises volume. This is a standard result in adverse-selection models
(e.g., Akerlof (1970), Hirshleifer (1971). When traders are fully cursed, the risk-sharing effect
is not present, and public revelation of the signals lowers volume. Put differently, not revealing
information and keeping it asymmetric impedes trade between rational traders but stimulates trade
between fully cursed ones. The case of partial cursedness is in-between the two extremes: public
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revelation of the signals causes volume to increase when χ is close to zero and to decrease when χ
is close to one.
The information-trading and risk-sharing effects are also at play under overconfidence and dis-
missiveness. Recall from Corollary 1 that in the absence of random endowments, public revelation
of the signals has no effect on overconfident or dismissive volume because traders can infer others’
signals from the price even when they do not observe them. This neutrality result continues to hold
with random endowments only in the extreme cases where traders are fully dismissive (γ = 0) or
fully overconfident (κ = ∞). This is because in both cases they believe that they do not learn useful
new information (for γ = 0 they view others’ signals as noise, and for κ = ∞ they believe that they
observe a perfectly informative signal). Between the two extreme cases, the information-trading
and risk-sharing effects come into play and neutrality does not hold. When traders are non-fully
dismissive, the latter effect dominates, and public revelation of the signals increases volume. The
former effect instead dominates when traders are also sufficiently overconfident.
Corollary 2 implies that the contrast between cursed and dismissive volume is sharpest when
the variance of endowment shocks is small. In that case, public revelation of information lowers
cursed volume for most values of χ (all values when the variance of endowment shocks is zero) but
raises dismissive volume.
4.3 Heterogeneous Traders
In this section we allow traders to be asymmetric in terms of their private-signal precision, risk-
aversion coefficient, and cursedness parameter. We maintain the other assumptions of Section 3
that traders observe no public signal and receive no random endowments.
We start by allowing traders to differ in their cursedness parameter χi, and for analytical
simplicity assume that some are rational (χi = 0) and the rest are fully cursed (χi = 1). We denote
by Nr and Nc = N −Nr, respectively, the numbers of rational and fully cursed traders, and by R









Proposition 7 Suppose that Nr traders are rational and Nc = N − Nr traders are fully cursed.
Traders are otherwise symmetric, receive no random endowments, and observe only their private
signals. The price (32) is an equilibrium price if and only if















[(Nr − 1)q +Nc]2 τη
(Nr − 1)q2 +Nc
, (35)
and q ∈ (0, 1) is the unique solution of
q =
Nc(1− q)(τǫ + τζ + τη)
[(Nr − 1)q2 +Nc] (τǫ + τζ + τη) + [(Nr − 1)q +Nc]2 τη
. (36)
When both rational and fully cursed traders are present in the market (1 ≤ Nr ≤ N−1), the former
trade in the direction of price movements and the latter in the opposite direction: the regression
xi = βi(p − d) + ν, (37)
yields coefficient βi > 0 for i ∈ R and βi < 0 for i ∈ C. Expected aggregate volume, viewed as a
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τǫ + τζ +Nτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
)2
< 0. (38)
When the shock ζ has zero variance, (38) holds if N exceeds a threshold N̄ .
As in Section 3, the price under-reacts to traders’ private signals. When traders differ in their
cursedness parameter, price inefficiency takes an additional form. While the price should give the
same weight to all signals because they all have the same precision, it overweights the signals of
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the fully cursed traders relative to those of the rational traders (q = Ar
Ac
< 1). This is because
rational traders give weight both to their signals and to those of cursed traders when forming their
expectations about the asset payoff, while fully cursed traders give weight to their signals only.
The price under-reaction implies positively autocorrelated price changes. Rational traders ex-
ploit this predictability by buying in Period 1 if the price rises relative to Period 0, and selling if
the price drops. This is reflected in a positive coefficient β in the regression (37) of signed volume
xi on the price change between Periods 0 and 1. Conversely, the coefficient is negative for cursed
traders, who are on the losing side of this trade.
The expected utility of rational traders is higher than that of cursed traders because they learn
from the price. In addition, because rational traders have the option not to trade, they are better
off relative to not trading. Cursed traders are instead worse off because there are no aggregate
gains from trade. Cursed traders are thus “exploited” by rational traders.
Because the predictability-induced trading by rational traders adds to trading volume, a market
in which some traders are rational and some are fully cursed can have higher volume than an
otherwise identical market where all traders are fully cursed. To show this result, we hold constant
the total number N of traders and change the number Nr of rational traders. When (38) holds,
volume increases when some rational traders enter the market (Nr > 0). A sufficient condition
for (38) to hold is that the total number N of traders is large: with a large number of cursed
traders, the predictability of price changes induces rational entrants to engage in a sizeable amount
of trading.
We next allow traders to differ in their risk aversion coefficient αi and private-signal precision







Proposition 8 Suppose that traders differ in their risk-aversion coefficients αi and private-signal
precisions τηi , are fully cursed, receive no random endowments, and observe only their private
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If all traders have the same risk-aversion coefficient α and the shock ζ has zero variance, then the
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where τη denotes the average precision of private signals. Trader i generates more volume than
trader j if and only if he observes a more precise private signal (τηi > τηj ).
As in Proposition 7, the price is inefficient both because it under-reacts to traders’ private
signals and because it does not give the correct relative weights to the signals. In the rational case,
where the price equals the expected value of the asset payoff d conditional on the signals, the weight
of a signal i is proportional to its precision τηi and does not depend on any other characteristic of
trader i (Grossman (1976)). Proposition 8 shows that when traders are fully cursed, the weight
is increasing in τηi but not proportionately, and depends on trader i’s risk aversion coefficient αi.
In particular, a trader who is less risk averse trades more aggressively on his signal, failing to
realize that he trades against others’ signals and that his trading activity causes his signal to be
overweighed.
Proposition 8 shows additionally that traders with more precise signals trade more. One may
conjecture that these traders are better off relative to those with less precise signals, in the same
way that rational traders are better off than cursed traders. Surprisingly, however, this conjecture
turns out not to be always true, as shown in an earlier version of this paper (Eyster, Rabin, and
Vayanos (2015)). On the one hand, cursed traders with more precise signals do not lose as much by
trading against others’ signals because their signal aligns better with the asset value, e.g., is more
likely to be negative when others’ signals are negative. On the other hand, they can overtrade,
taking on excessive risk, and this effect can dominate.
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5 Evidence on Cursedness
Cursed equilibrium, as defined by Eyster and Rabin (2005), captures the psychology behind the
winner’s curse in common-value auctions—the average price paid by the auction winner exceeds the
average value of the object being auctioned—in a manner sufficiently general to be applied across
strategic settings. It assumes that people fail to correctly infer other people’s private information
from those other people’s actions. In the context of common-value auctions, bidders fail to fully
appreciate the bad news inherent in winning, namely that their opponents have found it optimal to
bid lower. The winner’s curse has been documented empirically as well as in controlled laboratory
settings. Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) is an early empirical study in the context of auctions
for oil-drilling rights. Roll (1986) documents the winner’s curse in corporate takeovers. Kagel and
Levin (2002) review the voluminous laboratory evidence on the winner’s curse.
The same kind of failure of inference that characterizes bidding in common-values auctions
has been uncovered in other strategic settings. Esponda and Vespa (2014) report on a laboratory
experiment on voting in which people fail to draw the correct inference from the event that their
vote is pivotal. Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) and Holt and Sherman (1994) find that people
under-infer each other’s private information in laboratory experiments on positive-sum bilateral
trade. Carrillo and Palfrey (2011) find the same in zero-sum bilateral-trade experiments. Failure
of inference in bilateral-trade settings implies excessive trade. Weizsäcker (2010) presents a meta-
study of a social-learning experiment that documents that people do not learn as much as they
should from their predecessors’ choices.
More closely related to our paper are experimental papers that have tested for REE. Plott and
Sunder (1988) devise an experimental asset market in which an asset’s payoff takes one of three
possible values: v ∈ {50, 240, 490}. Given true value v, one-half of the subjects learn that the value
is not v′ 6= v, and the other half learn that the value is not v′′ 6= v, v′. For example, when v = 50,
one-half of the people learn v 6= 240, and the other half that v 6= 490; collectively, people’s private
information reveals the state. Plott and Sunder show that after several experimental rounds, the
prices generated by an oral double auction closely approximate REE prices, namely the true value.
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) essentially replicate Plott and Sunder’s design but find
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substantial deviations from REE. Corgnet, DeSantis, and Porter (2017) also replicate the same
design and identify prices very different from REE prices. They show that CEE with fully cursed
traders, fits their own data as well as the data of Biais et al. better than REE.13
Magnani and Oprea (2017) conduct an experiment intended to identify whether cursedness or
dismissiveness drives trade. They estimate that 80% of subjects employ cursed reasoning, but also
argue that most subjects are dismissive of others’ private information.
Evidence that investors do not sufficiently heed the information content of asset prices comes
not only from laboratory experiments but also from actual markets. Chague, De-Losso, and Gio-
vannetti (2018) study the behavior of individual investors around “fictitious price falls,” defined
as events when stock prices drop without a change in company value. One type of such events
are dividend payments: on ex-dividend dates, prices fall mechanically by the dividend amount,
which is announced well in advance. Chague et al. find that individuals buy stocks on ex-dividend
dates, and the more so the larger is the dividend. They also find that a trading strategy exploiting
individuals’ behavior earns abnormally high returns. These findings are consistent with CEE if
some cursed traders do not observe (or not fully understand) news on dividend payments.14
Another instance where individual investors appear to be giving undue positive weight to low
prices concerns “lottery-like” stocks. Kumar (2009) and Eraker and Ready (2015) find that in-
dividuals overinvest in low-priced stocks even though these stocks yield abnormally low returns.
To explain their findings, they hypothesize that individuals view low-priced stocks as lottery tick-
ets because of their positively-skewed payoffs (Barberis and Huang (2008)). Using data from the
options market, however, Birru and Wang (2016) estimate that investors exaggerate the positive
skeweness of low-priced stocks, because they fail to fully appreciate that low prices may signal low
future value. Among other findings, they show that skewness expectations increase on dates when
13Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) convincingly argue that overconfidence in one’s private information
should play no role in the information structure that they consider: how could someone who learns that v 6= 240
be overconfident about that information? In the same way, dismissiveness does not seem a likely explanation for
non-REE prices. Would a subject who learns that v 6= 240 and hears from the experimenter that one-half of the other
subjects learn either v 6= 50 or v 6= 490 really believe that despite the experimenter’s instructions other subjects hold
no payoff-relevant information?
14The findings of Chague, De-Losso, and Giovannetti (2018) are not driven by taxes because they extend to non-
taxable dividends. They do not extend to institutional investors, suggesting that only individual investors succumb
to the fallacy.
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prices fall mechanically because of stock splits.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new market equilibrium concept, cursed expectations equilibrium (CEE),
in which traders fail to fully infer information from market prices. Unlike agreeing-to-disagree
models in which traders have differences of opinion about the informativeness of exogenous private
signals but correctly infer others’ private signals from the price, cursed traders correctly perceive
the relationship between all exogenous variables and simply misperceive the relationship between
the endogenous price and traders’ exogenous private signals.
Cursed traders trade significant quantities and take on excessive risk. We show that cursed
volume per trader grows with the size of the market, whereas per-trader volume under overconfi-
dence or dismissiveness may decline to zero. Absent endowment shocks, revealing all private signals
would not affect trade due to overconfidence or dismissiveness, but would eliminate cursed trade.
Cursedness amplifies trading volume due to overconfidence, thus enabling that bias to have a more
significant effect. Markets comprising entirely cursed traders generate more trade than those com-
prising entirely rational traders; mixed markets can generate more trade still, because rationals
exploit the predictability of returns caused by cursed traders.
In Section 3, we showed the necessity in some settings of cursedness to “enable” overconfidence
to explain appreciable per-trader volume of trade. We conclude by speculating how cursedness
may similarly enable the study of various other biases in asset markets. Researchers have recently
proposed that a number of statistical errors may be relevant for financial decisions, including over-
inference from small samples (see Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010)) and non-belief in the
law of large numbers (see Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond (2016)). Predicting the consequences of
these and other biases for markets where traders extract information from prices requires additional
assumptions about traders’ theories of one another’s errors. Yet relatively little is known about how
people reason about others’ errors. In its extreme, cursedness provides a simple assumption about
what people think of others’ errors: they don’t think about them at all. If models of errors are
instead closed by assuming that people do agree to disagree about the meaning of private signals,
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then, much like with overconfidence in Section 3.3, we suspect that the per-trader volume of trade
will be small in information-rich settings where each trader values the sum total of others’ private
information far more heavily than his own private signal.
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Based on evidence from strategic situations, Eyster and Rabin (2005) define cursed equilibrium in
Bayesian games by the requirement that every player correctly predicts the behavior of others but
fails to fully attend to its informational content. In this appendix, we define cursed equilibrium
and illustrate its workings in a simple zero-sum game of speculative trade.
Cursed equilibrium is defined in finite Bayesian games of the form
({Ai}i=1,...,N , {Ti}i=0,...,N , p, {ui}i=1,...,N ) .
For each player i = 1, . . . , N , Ai is a finite set of available actions and Ti is a finite set of types,
including one, T0, for nature. We denote the set of action profiles by A ≡ ×
i=1,...,N
Ai and the set
of type profiles by T ≡ ×
i=0,...,N
Ti. We assume that all players share the common prior probability
distribution p over T . Player i’s utility function is ui : A× T → R.
A strategy for player i, σi : Ti → △Ai, specifies a probability distribution over actions for each
type. We denote by σi(ai|ti) the probability that type ti plays action ai when he follows strategy
σi. We denote the set of action profiles for players other than i by A−i ≡ ×
j 6=i
Aj, and the set of
type profiles for nature and players other than i by T−i ≡ ×
j 6=i
Tj . We denote by a−i and t−i generic
elements of these sets. We denote by σ−i(a−i|t−i) the probability that types t−i play action profile
a−i when they follow strategy σ−i ≡ {σj}j 6=0,i. Finally, we denote by p(t−i|ti) the distribution of
player i’s beliefs about other players’ types conditional on his own type ti. The standard solution
concept for these games is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 A strategy profile σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each player i, each type
ti ∈ Ti, and each a∗i such that σi(a∗i |ti) > 0:













To define cursed equilibrium, we compute for each type of each player the average strategy of





This is the marginal probability that other players play action profile a−i, and is derived by aver-
aging over type profiles t−i the probabilities σ−i(a−i|t−i) that other players play a−i conditional on
t−i. We associate to each player i a cursedness parameter χi ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3 A strategy profile σ is a cursed equilibrium if for each player i, each type ti ∈ Ti,
and each a∗i such that σi(a
∗
i |ti) > 0:









(1− χi)σ−i(a−i|t−i)ui(ai, a−i; ti, t−i)
+ χiσ−i(a−i|ti)ui(ai, a−i; ti, t−i)

 . (A.2)
Player i best-responds to beliefs that with probability 1− χi the other players’ actions depend
on their types (the probability of action profile a−i in (A.2) is conditional on type profile t−i) and
with probability χi actions do not depend on types (the probability of a−i in (A.2) is the marginal).
When χi = 0, player i is rational, and his objective is as in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Eq. (A.1)).
When χi = 1, player i is fully cursed, and neglects entirely the relationship between the other
players’ actions and their types. Note that while cursed players fail to map actions to types, they
assess correctly the probability distribution of other players’ actions.
To illustrate the concept, consider the following trading game. A seller owns an asset that he
knows to be worth s both to himself and to a potential buyer. The buyer does not know s, but
believes that it is randomly drawn from [0, 1] with a cumulative distribution function F . The buyer
makes the seller a take-it-or-leave-it offer p for the asset.
The seller’s optimal strategy is to accept the buyer’s offer p if and only if s ≤ p. In a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium the buyer understands this, and so chooses p to maximize F (p)×(E[s|s ≤ p]− p).
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This objective is the probability F (p) that the seller accepts the offer p, times the buyer’s expected
surplus from acquiring the asset conditional on seller acceptance. Because E[s|s ≤ p] < p for each
p > 0, the buyer’s optimal offer is p∗ = 0. Thus, no trade occurs, consistent with the no-trade
theorems of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982).
In a cursed equilibrium players fail to appreciate the informational content of others’ behavior.
This does not matter for the seller, who knows s perfectly and hence has nothing to learn, but
matters for the buyer. A buyer who is fully cursed completely neglects the relationship between the
seller’s willingness to sell at price p and the seller’s private information s, but correctly predicts the
probability distribution over the seller’s actions. As a consequence, a fully cursed buyer perceives
the expected value of an asset traded at price p to be its unconditional expectation, E[s]. A fully
cursed buyer thus chooses p to maximize F (p) × (E[s]− p). A partially cursed buyer appreciates
that the seller’s willingness to sell correlates with his private information but underestimates that
relationship. A buyer who is partially cursed with coefficient χ perceives the expected value of an
asset traded at price p to be (1−χ)E[s|s ≤ p] +χE[s]. This is the weighted average of the rational
belief with weight 1 − χ and the fully cursed belief with weight χ. In effect, the buyer believes
that with probability 1 − χ the seller’s decision to sell conveys information about the asset, and
with probability χ it does not. The coefficient χ measures the buyer’s naivety: χ = 0 corresponds
to full rationality, while χ = 1 corresponds to full cursedness. A χ-cursed buyer thus chooses p to
maximize F (p)× ((1− χ)E[s|s ≤ p] + χE[s]− p). Since E[s] > 0, the buyer’s optimal offer exceeds
zero for any χ > 0. Moreover, since the buyer’s objective function is supermodular in (p, χ) for
p ∈ [0,E[s]], Topkis’ Theorem implies that p∗ increases in χ. In summary, cursedness produces
trade in no-trade settings, and the more cursed the buyer, the higher the volume of trade.
B Proofs
We first prove the following lemma, which we use for proving Proposition 1.
Lemma B.1 Suppose that the variables (x, {yi}i=1,..,K) are normal, independent, with mean zero
and precisions (τx, {τyi}i=1,..,K). Then, the distribution of x conditional on {x+yi}i=1,..,K is normal
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with mean




















βi(x+ yi) + e, (B.3)
where {βi}i=1,..,K are the regression coefficients and e is the error term. Taking covariances of both
sides of (B.3) with x+ yi and noting that (x, {yi}i=1,..,K, e) are independent, we find
































Summing (B.4) across i and solving for
∑K












































































where the second step follows from (B.5) and (B.6). Since
τ (x |{x+ yi}i=1,..,K ) = τe,
(B.7) implies (B.2).
Proof of Proposition 1. We first determine traders’ demand functions using (8). Since d =
d+ ǫ+ ζ and ζ is independent of traders’ information Ii,
E(d|Ii) = d+ E(ǫ|Ii), (B.8)







Using Lemma B.1 with x = ǫ, K = 3 and {yj}j=1,2,3 = (ηi, η, ξi), we find
E(d|Iir) = d+
τηi
τǫ + τηi + τθ + τξi
si +
τθ
τǫ + τηi + τθ + τξi
s+
τξi










Using Lemma B.1 with x = ǫ, K = 2 and {yj}j=1,2 = (ηi, η), we find
E(d|Iic) = d+
τηi
τǫ + τηi + τθ
si +
τθ









Substituting (B.10), (B.11), (B.12) and (B.13) into (8), we can write the demand of trader i as
xi =











] − zi. (B.14)
We next substitute (B.14) into the market-clearing condition (5), use (6) to write p in terms of
({si}i=1,..,N , s, {zi}i=1,..,N ), and use (9) to write ǫ+ ξi in terms of ({si}j 6=i, {zi}j 6=i). This yields an
equation that is linear in ({si}i=1,..,N , s, {zi}i=1,..,N). Identifying terms in si yields (11). Identifying




(τǫ + τηi + τθ)





(τǫ + τηj + τθ)(τǫ + τηj + τθ + τξj )− (1− χj)τξj 1∑
k 6=j Ak
(τǫ + τηj + τθ)
αj
[
(τǫ + τηj + τθ)(τǫ + τηj + τθ + τξj) + τζ(τǫ + τηj + τθ + χjτξj )
] . (B.15)
Combining (B.15) with (11) yields (13).

















) = (N − 1)τη, (B.16)
where the first step follows because zj = 0 for all j, the second because Aj = A for all j, and the third
because {ηj}j=1,..,N are i.i.d. with precision τη. Setting (χi, αi, τηi , τθ, τξi , Ai) = (χ,α, τη , 0, (N −
1)τη, A) for all i in (11), we find (15). Eq. (15) implies that A decreases in χ.
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The coefficient β in the regression (16) is proportional to







(τǫ + τη)(τǫ +Nτη)− τη ([N − χ(N − 1)] τǫ +Nτη)− τǫN ([N − χ(N − 1)] τǫ +Nτη)
τǫ(τǫ + τη)(τǫ +Nτη)
= A
χ(N − 1)(τǫ +Nτη)
(τǫ + τη)(τǫ +Nτη)
> 0,
where the first step follows from (1) and (14), and the third from (15).
Setting (χi, αi, τηi , τθ, τξi , Ai, zi) = (χ,α, τη , 0, (N − 1)τη , A, 0) in (B.14), we can write the de-
mand of trader i as
xi =


























































































α [τζ (τǫ + [1 + χ(N − 1)] τη) + (τǫ + τη)(τǫ +Nτη)]
. (B.19)


















we find (17). Eq. (17) implies that E (|xi|) increases in χ. It also implies that E (|xi|) increases in



















decreases in N and N−1
N
increases in N .
Proof of Proposition 3. The coefficient A can be deduced from (11) by setting (χi, αi, τθ, Ai) =
(0, α, 0, A) for all i and deriving (τηi , τξi) based on traders’ subjective assessments of the precision
of private signals. Overconfidence implies that τηi = κτη for all i. Dismissiveness, combined with















1 + (N − 2)ρ .
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Substituting into (11), we find (18). Eq. (18) implies that A increases in κ and γ, and decreases in
ρ.


































































Substituting xi from (B.23) into (B.20), and using (B.21) (which remains valid under overconfi-
dence and dismissiveness because it concerns the true distribution of signals), we find (19). Eq.
(19) implies that E (|xi|) increases in κ and ρ, and decreases in γ. Eq. (19) also implies that
the asymptotic behavior of E (|xi|) and of aggregate volume NE (|xi|) when N grows large is as
described in the proposition.
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{κ [1 + (N − 2)ρ]− γ} τζ
√
2(N − 1)τη





[γρ(τǫ + τζ + 2κτη)− γ(κ− γ)τη ] τζ
√
2(N − 1)τη




{κ [1 + (N − 2)ρ] − γ} τζ√τη









terms, and differentiating using the product rule. Eq. (B.24) implies that dE(|xi|)
dN
has the same sign
as
G(N) ≡ 2N(N − 1) [γρ(τǫ + τζ + 2κτη)− γ(κ− γ)τη]
+ {[1 + (N − 2)ρ] (τǫ + τζ + κτη) + (N − 1)γτη} {κ [1 + (N − 2)ρ]− γ} .
The function G(N) is quadratic in N . To determine its sign, we distinguish cases according to the
sign of ρ(τǫ + τζ + 2κτη)− (κ− γ)τη.
Suppose first that
ρ(τǫ + τζ + 2κτη)− (κ− γ)τη < 0. (B.25)
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For N ∈ [0, 2],




(N − 2)(κ− γ)τη




(κ− γ)[τǫ + τζ + 2κτη + (N − 2)τη]
τǫ + τζ + 2κτη
> 0, (B.26)
where the first inequality follows from (B.25) and N ≤ 2, and the second is strict because (B.25)
implies κ > γ. Eq. (B.26) implies, in particular, that H(1) > 0. Since, in addition, ρ ≤ 1, G(1) ≥ 0.
We next show that G(N0) < 0 for some N0 < 0. If ρ = 0, then the existence of N0 follows from
limN→−∞G(N) = −∞. If ρ > 0, then we define N0 by H(N0) = 0. Since H(N) is linear, N0 is
uniquely defined, and is negative because H(N) > 0 for N > 2 and because (B.26) implies that
H(N) > 0 for N ∈ [0, 2]. Since N(N − 1) > 0 for N < 0, G(N0) < 0. Since G(N) is quadratic in
N , negative for N = N0 < 0, and non-negative for N = 1, its sign for N ≥ 2 is as follows:
• If limN→∞G(N) = ∞, then G(N) > 0 for N ≥ 2.
• If limN→∞G(N) = −∞ and G(2) > 0, then G(N) is positive for N ∈ [2, N1) and negative
for N > N1 for some N1 > 2.
• If G(2) < 0, then G(N) < 0 for N ≥ 2.
The condition for limN→∞G(N) = ∞ is (21), and it implies that E (|xi|) increases in N . The
condition for G(2) < 0 is (20), and it implies that E (|xi|) decreases in N . When these inequalities
are strict in the opposite direction, then limN→∞G(N) = −∞ and G(2) > 0, and hence E (|xi|) is
hump-shaped in N .
Suppose next that
ρ(τǫ + τζ + 2κτη)− (κ− γ)τη ≥ 0. (B.27)
Since H(N) > 0 for N ≥ 2, G(N) > 0 for N ≥ 2, and hence E (|xi|) increases in N . Since (B.27)
implies that the right-hand side of (21) is non-positive, this case is covered by (21).
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Proof of Corollary 1. Consider first the case where traders are cursed. When all private signals





because symmetry and normality imply that the sum of the signals is a sufficient statistic for all of



















for φ = r, c. Substituting (B.28) and (B.29) into (8), and setting zi = 0, we can write the demand
















Since all traders have the same demand, there is no trade.
Consider next the case where traders are overconfident or dismissive. When all private signals






. This is because trader
i treats the signals of the other traders as symmetric, but not symmetric with his own signal. Using







, and trader i’s subjective assessments
of precision, we find
E(d|Ii) = d+
κτη











N − 1 , (B.31)
Var(d|Ii) =
1

























































































Eq. (B.35) is identical to (B.23), and hence volume is the same as when the private signals are not
publicly revealed.
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3, except that we set χi to


































































































[κρ(τǫ + κτη) + χγκτη]τζ
√
2τη




In both cases the limit is positive and increasing in κ.
Proof of Proposition 5. We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2, except that we do not
set τθ to 0. Setting (χi, αi, τηi , τξi , Ai) = (χ,α, τη , (N − 1)τη, A) for all i in (11) and (12), we find
(24) and (25), respectively. Eqs. (24) and (25) imply, respectively, that A decreases in χ and B
increases in χ.
The coefficients (β1, β2) in the regression (26) can be derived by taking covariances of both sides
with p− d and s:
Cov(d− p, p− d) = β1Var(p − d) + β2Cov(s, p− d), (B.38)
Cov(d− p, s) = β1Cov(p− d, s) + β2Var(s). (B.39)
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Eqs. (B.38) and (B.39) form a linear system in (β1, β2). Its solution is
β1 =
Cov(d− p, p− d)Var(s)− Cov(d− p, s)Cov(s, p − d)
Var(p − d)Var(s)−Cov(s, p − d)2
, (B.40)
β2 = −
Cov(d− p, p− d)Cov(p− d, s)− Cov(d− p, s)Var(p − d)
Var(p− d)Var(s)− Cov(s, p− d)2
. (B.41)
Eqs. (1), (2) and (23) imply that
Cov(d− p, p− d) = (1−NA−B)(NA+B)σ2ǫ −NA2σ2η −B2σ2θ , (B.42)
Cov(d− p, s) = (1−NA−B)σ2ǫ −Bσ2θ . (B.43)
Using (24) and (25), we find
(1−NA−B)σ2ǫ −Bσ2θ =
τǫ + [1 + (N − 1)χ]τη + τθ
(τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
− τǫ + [1 + (N − 1)χ]τη + τθ
(τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
= 0.
Hence, (B.43) implies that Cov(d− p, s) = 0, and (B.42) implies that






χ(N − 1)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
(τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)
> 0,
where the third equality follows from (24) and (25). Since Cov(d− p, s) = 0, Cov(d− p, p− d) > 0
and Var(s) > 0, (B.40) implies that β1 > 0. Since Cov(d − p, s) = 0, Cov(d − p, p − d) > 0 and
Cov(p− d, s) > 0, (B.41) implies that β2 < 0.
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Setting (χi, αi, τηi , τξi , Ai, zi) = (χ,α, τη , (N − 1)τη , A, 0) in (B.14), we can write the demand of
trader i as
xi =



































where we use (9) and (23) to write ǫ + ξi as a function of p. Following the same steps as in the




























α [τζ (τǫ + [1 + χ(N − 1)] τη + τθ) + (τǫ + τη + τθ)(τǫ +Nτη + τθ)]
. (B.45)
Substituting xi from (B.45) into (B.20), and using (B.21), we find (27). Eq. (27) implies that

















Proposition B.1 Suppose that traders are symmetric and not cursed, receive no random endow-
ments, and observe their private signals and the public signal. Suppose also that each trader per-
ceives the precision of his private signal to be κ× τη for κ ≥ 1, the precision of every other trader’s
signal to be γ × τη for γ ∈ [0, 1], and the correlation between the noise terms in others’ signals to
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and is lower than when traders do not observe the public signal.
Proof of Proposition B.1. The coefficients (A,B) can be deduced from Proposition 1 with
the same substitutions as in Proposition 3 except that we do not set τθ to 0. Making the same











































Substituting xi from (B.50) into (B.20), and using (B.21), we find (B.48). Eq. (B.48) implies that
E (|xi|) decreases in τθ.
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where the second step follows because {ηj}j=1,..,N are independent of {zj}j=1,..,N , and the third step
because {ηj}j=1,..,N are i.i.d. with precision τη and {zj}j=1,..,N are i.i.d. with precision τz. Setting






, A,C) for all i in (11) and (13), we find (29) and
(30), respectively. Eq. (30) is cubic in C
A










τζτη − α(τǫ + τζ + τη) < 0, then χCAτζτη − α(τǫ + χτζ + τη) < 0. Hence, the left-hand
side of (30) would be negative rather than zero, a contradiction. Because of (B.52), the derivative
of the left-hand side of (30) with respect to C
A
is positive at any solution of (30). Hence, (30) has
a unique solution.
Setting (χi, αi, τηi , τθ, τξi , Ai, Ci) = (χ,α, τη , 0, τξ , A,C) in (B.14), we can write the demand of
trader i as
xi =
















] − zi (B.53)
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where we use (9) and (28) to write ǫ + ξi as a function of p. Following the same steps as in the






















































































Since for (χi, αi, τηi , τθ, τξi , Ai, Ci) = (χ,α, τη , 0, τξ, A,C), (13) implies that
α [τζ(τǫ + τη + χτξ) + (τǫ + τη)(τǫ + τη + τξ)] =
C
A
τζτη(τǫ + τη + χτξ),
we can write (B.54) as
xi =
[


















(1− χ)(τǫ + τη) τξN−1

































τη(τǫ + τη + χτξ)
. (B.55)
Substituting xi from (B.55) into (B.20), and using (B.51), (B.21) and its counterpart for {zi}i=1,..,N ,
and the independence between {si}i=1,..,N and {zi}i=1,..,N , we find (31).
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Eq. (B.56) implies that E (|xi|) increases in N if CA increases in N . The result that CA increases in
N holds for all χ ∈ [0, 1), as can be seen from differentiating (30) implicitly. Indeed, the derivative
of the left-hand side of (30) with respect to C
A
is positive at any solution of (30). Moreover,
the argument establishing (B.52) implies that this inequality is strict for all χ ∈ [0, 1). Hence,
χC
A
τζτη − α(τǫ + χτζ + τη) < 0 at any solution of (30), and the derivative of the left-hand side of
(30) with respect to N is also negative.





















is independent of N , (B.57) implies that
E (|xi|) increases in N .
Proposition B.2 Suppose that traders are symmetric and not cursed, receive random endowments,
and observe only their private signals and endowment shocks. Suppose also that each trader perceives
the precision of his private signal to be κ× τη for κ ≥ 1, the precision of every other trader’s signal
to be γ × τη for γ ∈ [0, 1], and the correlation between the noise terms in others’ signals to be

























> 0 is the unique solution to the cubic equation
(







κτζτη − α(τǫ + τζ + κτη)
)
− (N − 1)αγτητz = 0. (B.59)
























Proof of Proposition B.2. The coefficients (A,C) can be deduced from Proposition 1 with the





























[1 + (N − 2)ρ] τz + C2A2 γτη
. (B.61)















] − zi. (B.62)






























which is the same as (B.54) except that χ is set to zero and τη is replaced by κτη. Since for
(χi, αi, τηi , τθ, τξi , Ai, Ci) = (0, α, κτη , 0, τξ , A,C), (13) implies that



























Substituting xi from (B.65) into (B.20), and using (B.61), (B.21) and its counterpart for {zi}i=1,..,N ,
and the independence between {si}i=1,..,N and {zi}i=1,..,N , we find (B.60). For ρ = 0, (B.59) implies
that C
A
converges to ∞ when N grows large, and is of order N 13 . For ρ > 0, (B.59) implies that
C
A
converges to a positive limit. In both cases, (B.60) implies that E (|xi|) converges to a positive
limit.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider first the case where traders are cursed. Proceeding as in the















] − zi. (B.66)


































































































































and does not hold. By continuity, it also does not hold when χ is close to one. This establishes the
results in the corollary for rational (χ = 0) and cursed traders.
Consider next the case where traders are overconfident or dismissive. Proceeding as in the proof


















































Substituting xi from (B.65) into (B.20), and using (B.21) and its counterpart for {zi}i=1,..,N , as





























Eqs. (B.60) and (B.72) imply that volume increases when all private signals are publicly revealed












































































































where the second step follows from (B.61) and (B.64). Setting
f(X) ≡ γτz
[1 + (N − 2)ρ] τz +X2γτη
,
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where the second step follows by squaring both sides and rearranging.
When γ = 0, (B.74) holds as an equality because f(X) = 0. In the limit when κ goes to
∞, (B.74) also holds as an equality because (B.59) implies that C
A
takes a positive value. This
establishes the results in the corollary for fully dismissive and fully overconfident traders.
Using
[






























(τǫ + τζ +Nκτη)











































we next simplify (B.74) to
− f(0)(τǫ + τζ +Nκτη)
[



























[τǫ + τζ + κτη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ]2 > 0. (B.75)







, which are zero when κ = ∞ and
γ = 0, respectively, and which make (B.74) hold as an equality in those cases.) The left-hand side





, which varies from f(0) to 0 as C
A























= 0, we can write the left-hand side of (B.75) as
−f(0)(τǫ+τζ+Nκτη)
[
τǫ + τζ + κτη +
f(0)
2κ
[(N − 2)κτη − (τǫ + τζ)]
]
+[τǫ + τζ + κτη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ]2 .
(B.77)
For κ = 1, (B.76) is equal to





[τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ]
> (1− f(0)) [τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη − f(0)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη)]
= (1− f(0))2(τǫ + τζ + τη) > 0,
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and (B.77) is equal to
− f(0)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη)
[
τǫ + τζ + τη +
f(0)
2
[(N − 2)τη − (τǫ + τζ)]
]
+ [τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ]2
> [τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ] {−f(0)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη) + [τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ]}
= (1− f(0)) [τǫ + τζ + τη + (N − 1)f(0)τη ] (τǫ + τζ + τη) > 0.
Since the left-hand side of (B.75) is positive at both ends of the interval, it is positive for all values
of C
A
, and hence (B.75) holds. For κ large, the largest term in (B.76) is κ[1 − Nf(0)]τη and the
largest term in (B.77) is κ2[1−Nf(0)]τ2η . Both are negative if
1−Nf(0) = 1 + (N − 2)ρ−Nγ
1 + (N − 2)ρ < 0.
Hence, for κ large and 1 + (N − 2)ρ −Nγ < 0, (B.75) does not hold. This establishes the results
in the corollary for non-fully dismissive and non-fully overconfident traders.
Proof of Proposition 7. Setting τηi = τη for all i, Ai = Ar for i ∈ R, and Ai = Ac for i ∈ C in
the first equation in (B.16), we find
τξi =









[(Nr − 1)Ar +NcAc]2 τη
(Nr − 1)A2r +NcA2c
≡ τξ. (B.78)
for i ∈ R. Setting (αi, τηi) = (α, τη) for all i, (χi, τξi , Ai) = (0, τξ, Ar) for i ∈ R, and (χi, Ai) =
(1, Ac) for i ∈ C in (11), we find
τη − τξ Ar(Nr−1)Ar+NcAc






τǫ + τη + τξ − τξ 1(Nr−1)Ar+NcAc
)
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
Nc(τǫ + τη)
τǫ + τζ + τη

 (B.79)
for a rational trader, and
τη






τǫ + τη + τξ − τξ 1(Nr−1)Ar+NcAc
)
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
Nc(τǫ + τη)




for a fully cursed trader. The system of (B.78), (B.79) and (B.80) can be reduced into one equation
in the unknown q ≡ Ar
Ac
. Indeed, using q, we can write (B.78) and (B.80) as (35) and (34),
respectively. Moreover, dividing (B.79) by (B.80), we find
τη − τξ q(Nr−1)q+Nc
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
τǫ + τζ + τη
τη





(τǫ + τζ + τη)





where the second step follows by (35). Equation (B.81) yields (36).
For q ≤ 0, the left-hand side of (36) is non-positive and the right-hand side is positive. For
q ≥ 1 the left-hand side of (36) is positive and the right-hand side is non-positive. Therefore, a
solution of (36) must belong to (0, 1). For q ∈ (0, 1), the left-hand side of (36) is increasing in q
and the right-hand side is decreasing in q (because the numerator is decreasing, the denominator
is increasing, and both are positive). Since the left-hand side is zero at q = 0, and the right-hand
side is zero at q = 1, a solution of (36) exists and is unique.
We next determine the sign of the coefficient βi in the regression (37). Because of symmetry, βi
is equal to a common value βr for all rational traders and to a common value βc for all fully cursed
traders. We show that βc < 0; this will imply that βr > 0 because market clearing (5) implies that
Nrβr +Ncβc = 0.


























where the first step follows by setting (χi, τηi , zi) = (1, τη , 0) in (B.14), and the second from (1) and
(32). To determine the sign of (B.82), we compute some of the terms in that equation.
66





τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
Ncτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
=
Nr(τη + τξ)
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
Ncτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
,
where
D ≡ Nr(τǫ + τη + τξ)
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
Nc(τǫ + τη)



















(τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ)D
= − Nrτǫτξ
(τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ)(τǫ + τη)D
. (B.83)














τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
NcAcτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
=
NrArτη +Nr [(Nr − 1)Ar +NcAc] τη
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
NcAcτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
=
Nr(NrAr +NcAc)τη
τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ
+
NcAcτη
τǫ + τζ + τη
,





















(τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ)D
. (B.84)
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Equations (B.83) and (B.84) imply that (B.82) is equal to
− Nrτξ(NrAr +NcAc)





(τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ)D
=
Nr(τǫ + τη + τξ)(Ac −NrAr −NcAc)
(τǫ + τζ + τη + τξ)(τǫ + τη)D
.
This is negative because Nc ≥ 1, Ar > 0 and Ac > 0.
We finally show that if (38) holds, then expected aggregate volume when all N traders are fully
cursed is larger than when N − 1 traders are fully cursed and one trader is rational. This will
establish that expected aggregate volume is maximum at an interior point if (38) holds, because
volume when all N traders are rational is zero.
When all N traders are fully cursed, expected volume per trader can be derived from (17) by









To compute expected aggregate volume when N − 1 traders are fully cursed and one trader is
rational, we start by computing the expected volume that one fully cursed trader generates. Setting
(χi, αi, τηi , τθ, zi) = (1, α, τη , 0, 0) in (B.14), substituting p from (32), and denoting the rational
trader by ir, we can write the quantity that trader i 6= ir trades in equilibrium as
xi =
τζ(τǫ + τη)










aiir ≡ −Ar, (B.88)
aij ≡ −Ac for j 6= i, ir. (B.89)
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Using (1), we can write (B.86) as
xi =
τζ(τǫ + τη)

















Substituting xi from (B.90) into (B.20), and noting that the N + 1 variables (ǫ, {ηi}i=1,..,N) are
mutually independent, we find
E (|xi|) =
τζ(τǫ + τη)






























For Nr = 1 and Nc = N − 1, (35) implies that τξ = (N − 1)τη, (36) implies that
x =
τǫ + τζ + τη
2(τǫ + τζ) + (N + 1)τη
,
and (33) and (34) become
Ar =
τη(τǫ + τζ + τη)
G , (B.92)
Ac =
τη [2(τǫ + τζ) + (N + 1)τη ]
G , (B.93)
respectively, where
G ≡ (N − 1)(τǫ + τη)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη) + (τǫ +Nτη)(τǫ + τζ + τη).
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Substituting (Ar, Ac) from (B.92) and (B.93) into (B.87)-(B.89), we find
aii =

















(N − 1)(τǫ + τζ + τη)2
+2(N − 2)(τǫ + τζ + τη)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη) + (N − 2)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη)2
]
. (B.96)










Nc ≡(τǫ +Nτη)(τǫ + τζ + τη) [(N − 1)(τǫ + τζ + τη) + 2(N − 2)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη)]
+ (N − 2)(N − 1)(τǫ + τη)(τǫ + τζ +Nτη)2.
We next compute the expected trading volume that the rational trader ir generates. The





















where the second step follows from (B.86), and the third by inverting the order of summation.
Using (B.98) and proceeding as in the derivation of (B.91), we find
E (|xir |) =
τζ(τǫ + τη)





















































(N − 1)2τǫτη(τǫ + τζ + τη)
(τǫ + τη)G
. (B.100)
















− (N − 1)Ac
)2
=
(N − 1)τ2η (τǫ + τζ + τη)2
[




where the second step follows from (B.92) and (B.93). Using (B.100) and (B.101), we can write
(B.99) as
E (|xir |) =
τζ
√
2(N − 1)τη(τǫ +Nτη)Nr
αG√π , (B.102)
where
Nr ≡ (N − 1)2(τǫ + τη)− (N − 2)(τǫ +Nτη).
Combining (B.85) with (B.97) and (B.102), we find that expected aggregate trading volume is
larger when one trader is rational and N − 1 traders are fully cursed than when all N traders are




(τǫ + τζ + τη)
√
N
< (N − 1)
√
(τǫ + τη)Nc
(τǫ + τζ + τη)G
+
√






(N − 1)(τǫ + τη)Nc
G +




Equation (B.103) holds under the sufficient condition
N <
(N − 1)(τǫ + τη)Nc
G2 +




Multiplying both sides by G2, using the definitions of (G,Nc,Nr), and rearranging, we can write
(B.104) as (38).














+ 1 < 0. (B.105)
Setting y ≡ τη
τǫ







− (N − 3)(1 +Ny)
(N − 1)(1 + y) + 1 < 0
3− (N2 − 6N − 1)y + (4N − 1)y2 < 0. (B.106)
The left-hand side of (B.106) converges to −∞ when N goes to ∞. Hence, (B.106) holds for N
large enough.
Proof of Proposition 8. Setting (χi, τθ) = (1, 0) for all i in (11), we find (40). Setting (χi, τθ, zi) =
(1, 0, 0) in (B.14), and substituting p from (39), we find
xi =
τζ(τǫ + τηi)










aij ≡ −Aj for j 6= i. (B.109)
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 7, we find
E (|xi|) =
τζ(τǫ + τηi)































When αi = α for all i and τζ = ∞, (40) implies that Ai = τηiN(τǫ+τη) . Substituting into (B.108) and
(B.109), we find
aii =
[(N − 1)τǫ +Nτη − τηi ] τηi











(τǫ + τηi)(τǫ + τη)
.






































where the second step follows from the definition of τη. Eq. (41) follows from (B.111) by separating
quadratic, linear and constant terms in τǫ. Trader i generates more volume than trader j if and
only if the difference between the term inside the squared root in (41) and the corresponding term
for j is positive. The difference is
[
(N − 2)τ2ǫ + (N − 2)τǫ(τηi + τηj ) + (Nτη − τηi − τηj )τη
]
(τηi − τηj ).
Since








the difference is positive if and only if τηi > τηj .
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